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Does Wage Dispersion Make All Firms Productive?
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This article puts the relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity to an updated 
test, taking advantage of access to detailed Belgian linked employer-employee panel data. 
Controlling for simultaneity issues, time-invariant workplace characteristics and dynamics in 
the adjustment process of productivity, empirical results reveal the existence of a positive 
impact from conditional intra-firm wage dispersion to firm productivity (measured by the 
average value added per hour worked), which however decreases for higher dispersion 
levels. Findings thus suggest that the incentive effect of wage dispersion, predicted for 
instance by the ‘tournament’ model, dominates ‘fairness’ and/or ‘sabotage’ considerations. 
Further results reveal that the influence of wage dispersion on firm productivity is stronger 
among firms with a larger proportion of highly skilled workers but does not depend on 
whether wages are collectively renegotiated at the firm level. 
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In the context of asymmetric information on the labour market, firms try to design appropriate 
incentive practices in order to optimize workers’ effort. The implementation of performance-
related pay systems may contribute to the achievement of this goal. These systems can be 
based on absolute criteria so that individual pay depends on individual productivity (e.g. piece 
rates). However, they can also rely on relative indicators so that a worker’s wage depends on 
his or her relative productivity (e.g. on the ratio of individual productivity to average 
productivity of all co-workers). 
According to Lazear (1995), there are two reasons why firms may prefer compensation 
schemes based on relative rather than absolute criteria. A first argument is that the relative 
position of a worker may be more easily assessed than his absolute performance. Another 
point is that relative comparisons are not affected by common shocks to productivity (e.g. an 
economic downturn). On the contrary, worker’s effort might be incorrectly assessed by 
performance-related pay systems based on absolute criteria in case of economic downturn and 
the associated lower output level. When shocks are important, relative performance has 
therefore to be privileged in order for workers involvement not to be reduced. However, 
relative comparisons create a negative externality of individual effort on the wages of co-
workers. Indeed, if a worker increases his effort, ceteris paribus, he reduces the relative 
performance of his colleagues and hence their future wages. Bandiera et al. (2005) show that 
if workers internalize this externality, piece rates may lead to a higher average productivity 
than relative compensation schemes. Their empirical analysis, based on personnel data from a 
leading farm in the U.K., also reveals that this internalization process only occurs when 
workers are able to monitor each other. Whether performance pay should be based on 
absolute or relative criteria is thus likely to depend on the firm’s working environment. 
Moreover, both schemes are not mutually exclusive and may be combined in order to 
optimise workers’ productivity. For instance, Schöttner and Thiele (2007) analyse the optimal 
combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in order to 
achieve incentive and selection goals. 
The introduction of performance-related pay systems typically leads to an increase in 
the dispersion of wages. According to Belfield and Marsden (2003, p 456), this result is due 
to the fact that ‘there is a greater underlying variation in the individual endowments that 






determination, etc.) than in those that determine input (e.g. ability to put in eight hours per 
day, etc.)’. Lemieux et al. (2009) show in addition that wages are more closely tied to 
observed and unobserved worker characteristics in performance-related pay jobs. They also 
find that the growing incidence of pay-for-performance mechanisms accounts for about one 
quarter of the growth in the variance of male wages in the U.S. between the late 1970s and the 
early 1990s (and for almost all of the growth in wage dispersion observed above the 80th 
percentile). 
The impact of a growing wage dispersion (due to the use of performance-related pay 
systems) on firm productivity is not clear-cut from a theoretical point of view. Lazear and 
Rosen (1981), for example, show that a rank-order payment scheme (i.e. a system which 
rewards workers on the basis of their relative position in the firm) can induce a high level of 
effort among workers. This scheme motivates workers by establishing an upward-sloping 
occupational wage profile and by awarding particularly large salaries to executives. Put 
differently, it incites workers to put forth effort (i.e. to perform better than their peers) in 
order to be promoted and increase their earnings. These ideas, at the basis of Lazear and 
Rosen’s (1981) ‘tournament’ model, thus suggest that a differentiated wage structure is good 
for firm productivity. However, other theories based on ‘fairness’ considerations stress that 
wage compression stimulates cohesiveness among the workforce and is therefore beneficial 
for productivity (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Levine, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of wage inequality on firm productivity is 
also very inconclusive (e.g. Eriksson, 1999; Hibbs and Locking, 2000; Lallemand et al., 2007; 
Martins, 2008; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999). Moreover, findings must be interpreted 
with caution because of methodological and/or data limitations (i.e. in terms of indicators 
used, data coverage or estimation strategy). In addition, only few studies consider that this 
relationship might be influenced by specific working environments, even though, as indicated 
by Pfeffer and Langton (1993, p 383), ‘one of the more useful avenues for research on pay 
systems may be precisely this task of determining not which pay scheme is best but, rather, 
under what conditions salary dispersion has positive effects and under what conditions it has 
negative effects’. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, it puts the relationship between wage 
dispersion and firm productivity to an updated test, taking advantage of access to detailed 
Belgian linked employer-employee (hereafter LEE) panel data for the years 1999-2006. These 
data offer several advantages. On the one hand, the panel covers a large part of the private 






per hour worked) and allows to control for a wide range of worker and firm characteristics 
(such as education, occupation, gender, working time, firm size and sector). On the other 
hand, it enables to compute an indicator for conditional intra-firm wage dispersion (i.e. a 
measure of the variation in earnings that controls for observed worker characteristics) and to 
address important methodological issues such as firm-level time-invariant heterogeneity, 
endogeneity of wage dispersion and state dependence of firm productivity. Second, the paper 
investigates whether the impact of wage inequality on firm productivity varies across working 
environments. More precisely, it examines the interaction with the skills of the workforce and 
the industrial relations regime. To our knowledge, the second issue has so far only been 
empirically explored by Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) with German data. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
regarding the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity. We describe our methodology 
in Section 3 and present the data set in Section 4. The impact of intra-firm wage dispersion on 
firm productivity is analysed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the literature 
 
2.1.  Wage dispersion and firm productivity 
 
The theoretical literature disagrees on how intra-firm wage dispersion may affect 
productivity. On the one hand, theories based on ‘fairness’ considerations emphasize that 
wage compression improves labour relations, stimulates the cohesiveness among workers 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Levine, 1991) and reduces personal rent-seeking activities 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990), which in turn is beneficial for firm performance. On the other 
hand, the ‘tournament’ model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) points out that a more differentiated 
wage structure stimulates workers’ effort through the incentive resulting from awarding the 
largest prize to the most productive worker.
1 However, Lazear (1989) later shows in his 
‘industrial politics and sabotage’ model that tournament theory might also sometimes imply 
wage compression. The point is that if workers compete for the same prize, their effort might 
be misdirected away from competition to sabotage or unfair attempts to induce rivals’ failure 
                                                 
1 As highlighted in the introduction, a dispersed wage structure can also arise from other types of pay-for-
performance mechanisms. The association between wage inequality and performance-related pay schemes based 






in order to win the prize. Lazear (1989) therefore points out that a compressed wage structure 
should be preferred when the initial incentive effect of a performance-related pay system is 
offset by a lower degree of work cohesion due to the sabotage behaviour of some workers. 
Empirical studies investigating the impact of wage dispersion on firm performance also 
provide very different conclusions (see Appendix 1). Moreover, results must often be 
considered with care due to methodological and/or data limitations. Initial papers regarding 
the effects of wage dispersion on firm productivity were generally restricted to a particular 
segment of the labour force (e.g. the top-management level) or a specific sector of the 
economy (e.g. professional team sports). More recently, the availability for certain countries 
of LEE data, covering large parts of the economy and including firm-level information on 
financial variables, has allowed to extend the analysis to broader occupational groups and 
industries. However, the validity of most studies is hampered by various shortcomings. A 
number of papers rely on unconditional indicators of wage dispersion, while ‘tournament’ and 
‘fairness’ theories assume workers with comparable characteristics and therefore suggest the 
use of conditional indicators. Moreover, whereas theoretical predictions refer to productivity 
effects of wage inequality, studies often consider (due to data limitations) proxies like the 
value of production, sales or profits. The potential simultaneity between productivity and 
wage dispersion is another problem that is generally not addressed. Yet, it may be argued that 
highly productive firms pay larger wages to their most productive workers, which in turn 
leads to more wage dispersion. Many studies are also limited by the use of cross-sectional 
data, so that the causality from wage dispersion to productivity cannot be tested. In addition, 
the potential state dependence of firm productivity is rarely controlled for, even though 
current firm productivity is likely to depend on past values. Finally, Bond (2002, p 156) 
argues that adopting a dynamic specification is sometimes useful ‘for identifying the 
parameters of interest, even when the dynamics themselves are not the principal focus of 
attention’. 
To our knowledge, only eight papers investigate the relationship between wage 
dispersion and firm performance for broad occupational groups and industries (i.e. not 
exclusively for executives or sports professionals) while controlling for firm time-invariant 
heterogeneity (see Table 1). 
 







Yet, only half of these papers rely on a conditional indicator of wage dispersion and address 
the simultaneity problem. Moreover, Braakmann (2008) provides the only study controlling 
for potential state dependence of productivity in addition to the issues mentioned above. It is 
also worth to mention that a minority of these papers actually examine the productivity effects 
of wage inequality by using more appropriate measures suggested by theory. More precisely, 
they use as dependent variable the firm value added divided by the number of employees. 
This indicator, however, remains somewhat crude as it does not control for the mean number 
of working hours within firms (and for changes in this variable over time). It thus 
mechanically underestimates the productivity in firms employing a larger (or growing) 
proportion of part-time workers and may lead to biased estimates. Information on firm-level 
value added per hour worked or full-time equivalent worker would obviously enable to 
overcome this problem. 
 
2.2. Working  environments 
 
Articles investigating the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity across working 
environments are not numerous. However, studies like Pfeffer and Langton (1993) suggest 
that the magnitude of the negative impact of wage dispersion on academic departments’ 
performance depends on a person’s position in the salary structure and factors such as 
information, commitment, consensus and the level of certainty in the evaluation process. 
Beaumont and Harris (2003) show that the impact of pay inequality on U.K. firm performance 
depends on the sector and on differences in firm size and ownership. Koubi and Roux (2006) 
analyse the influence of wage dispersion on firm performance across different sectors in 
France. According to their estimates, the elasticity between productivity and wage dispersion 
is strongest in the construction industry and appears to be insignificant in services. Using data 
from the U.K., Belfield and Marsden (2003) find that the extent to which the use of 
performance-related pay increases performance depends on the structure of monitoring 
environments.  
Overall, existing studies clearly indicate that the impact of wage dispersion on firm 
productivity depends substantially on the working environment. In this paper, we investigate 
the role played by i) the skills of the workforce and ii) the industrial relations regime. 
There is no consensus on how workers’ skills may affect the relationship between wage 
dispersion and firm productivity. According to Lazear (1989, 1995), Milgrom (1988) and 






optimal for highly skilled workers when they behave more opportunistically (e.g. are more 
willing to engage in sabotage or rent-seeking activities in case of excessive wage dispersion). 
In contrast, Prendergast (2002) suggests that it is more important to tie wages to firm 
performance for highly skilled workers as they are more likely to occupy complex jobs that 
are harder to monitor. This point of view is also supported by Foss and Laursen (2005) who 
argue that performance pay is less required in ‘low-knowledge’ industries (mainly employing 
low-skilled workers) as the latter are less confronted with problems caused by asymmetrical 
information. Another reason, suggested by Barth et al. (2008), for why high-skilled workers 
should be more intensively paid according to performance than their low-skilled counterparts, 
is that the former might increase their productivity more easily than the latter. Empirical 
studies regarding the effect of workers’ skills on the elasticity between performance and wage 
dispersion also provide mixed results (Bingley and Eriksson, 2001; Grund and Westergaard-
Nielsen, 2008; Lallemand et al, 2007; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999). Moreover, they 
might be limited by the fact that they rely on the distinction between white- and blue-collar 
staff to measure the level of skills. Indeed, this choice might not be the most appropriate as 
some blue-collar workers occupy jobs requiring more skills than those brought to bear by 
white-collar workers. Mahy et al. (2010) aim to avoid this problem using information on the 
workers’ education and occupation and by assuming that highly skilled workers have a higher 
level of education than their low-skilled counterparts and occupy jobs requiring more skills. 
Using cross-sectional data for Belgium, they find that the intensity of the relationship between 
wage dispersion and firm productivity is stronger for highly skilled workers. 
Another important issue is whether the elasticity between productivity and wage 
dispersion depends on the industrial relations regime. It is often argued that unions tend to 
reduce the use of pay-for-performance mechanisms (and wage dispersion) because of i) the 
increased risk of favoritism and discrimination and ii) the greater solidarity between workers 
and power of unions when workers receive similar wages (Brown, 1990; Freeman, 1982; 
Lemieux et al., 2009). According to Barth et al. (2008), unions could also decrease the need 
for performance-related pay as they bargain over rent-sharing, which could already motivate 
workers. However, the fact that unions are generally averse to wage dispersion and 
performance pay does not imply that the impact of wage dispersion on firm performance will 
be weaker in the presence of strong unions. According to Pfeffer and Langton (1993), the 
effect of performance pay (i.e. increased wage dispersion) on firm performance depends 
positively on factors such as information, commitment, consensus and certainty in the 






performance pay systems are implemented with the agreement of trade unions. Bryson et al. 
(2005, p 453) also highlight unions’ ability to act as a voice for workers, ‘helping them to 
overcome the incentive problems in generating public goods such as better health and safety 
conditions in the workplace’. Unions could thereby strengthen incentives provided by wage 
dispersion and therefore favour firms’ productivity. If this is indeed the case, then wage 
dispersion would be more productivity-enhancing in firms with strong union representation. 
However, Bryson et al. (2005) stress the importance of the interaction between unions and the 
management. Moreover, the extent to which relations are based on trust further conditions 
how productivity relates to incentives. It can also be argued that collective bargaining may 
create difficulties for firms to pursue a coherent internal wage policy with effective 
differential rewards (Jirjahn and Kraft, 2007). This would then imply that pay-for-
performance mechanisms are less efficient in firms with strong unions. 
To our knowledge, Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) is the only empirical study investigating 
whether the relationship between wage dispersion and productivity depends on (different 
facets of) the industrial relations regime. Using cross-sectional data from the German 
manufacturing sector, they find that the elasticity between productivity and wage dispersion is 
weaker in the presence of a work council (i.e. a mechanism for establishment-level co-
determination). The explanation for this result would be as follows. Work councils act as a 
collective voice that helps workers to communicate their aggregated preferences to the 
management, which in turn uses this information to optimize its provision of workplace 
public goods and to establish a more efficient personnel policy. Overall, work councils would 
thus lead to enhanced productivity.
2 Yet, the contribution of work councils to productivity 
would diminish as establishment-level wage dispersion rises given that the role of work 
councils (i.e. the aggregation of workers’ preferences and the transmission of information to 
the management) would become more difficult when the diversity in working conditions 
and/or workers rises (i.e. when wage dispersion increases). Furthermore, Jirjahn and Kraft 
(2007) find that the elasticity between productivity and wage dispersion is stronger in 
establishments that are not covered by a collective agreement. According to the authors, this 
finding could derive from the fact that uncovered firms are probably less constrained in their 
wage policy so that their wage dispersion would reflect a more balanced provision of 
penalties and rewards. 
                                                 






Wage bargaining in the Belgian private sector differs from that in Germany. It occurs at 
three levels, namely the national (or inter-professional), sectoral and company level. They 
generally occur every two years on a pyramidal basis. In principle, they are inaugurated by a 
national collective agreement defining a minimum level in wage terms. Next, this national 
agreement is improved within every sector of activity. Finally, sectoral collective agreements 
are renegotiated in some firms. However, the wage renegotiated at the firm level can only be 
greater than or equal to the wage set at the national and/or industry level. Given these 
institutional features, our empirical analysis will investigate whether the elasticity between 
productivity and wage dispersion is different in firms solely covered by an industry (and a 




3. Methodology   
 
3.1. Basic  specification 
 
Two types of wage dispersion indicators can be found in the literature: unconditional 
indicators, where wage dispersion is measured between heterogeneous workers, and 
conditional indicators, where wage dispersion is estimated between workers with similar 
characteristics. Since theories such as ‘tournaments’ or ‘fairness’ refer to wage differentials 
between comparable workers, we examine the impact of a conditional wage dispersion 
indicator on firm productivity using the two-step procedure proposed by Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller (1999). 
In the first step, we compute the conditional wage inequality indicator. Therefore, we 
estimate by OLS the following wage equation for each firm and each year separately: 
 
ln wijt = α0 + yijt α1 + εijt                                   (1) 
 
                                                 
3 Note that industry and firm agreements can be combined in Belgium, whereas in Germany they are mutually 
exclusive. Another distinctive feature is that the collective bargaining coverage rate in Belgium is above 90 
percent (OECD, 2004). Only self-employed workers may not be covered by a collective wage agreement. Yet, 






where wijt is the gross hourly wage (including bonuses) of worker i in firm j at year t, yijt is a 
vector of individual characteristics including age (2 dummies), sex, education (2 dummies) 
and occupation (1 dummy), and εijt is the error term.
4 
The standard deviations of the residuals of these regressions run firm by firm and year 
by year, σjt, are then used as a conditional measure of wage dispersion in the second step, 
which consists in estimating the following firm-level productivity equation:  
 
ln va_hourjt = β0 + β1 σjt + xjt β2 + zjt β3 + γt + νjt                                                           (2) 
 
where va_hourjt is the productivity of firm j at year t, measured by the average value added 
per hour worked, σjt is the conditional wage dispersion indicator, xjt is a vector containing 
aggregated characteristics of workers, i.e. the share of the workforce that: i) has at most a 
degree of lower secondary education, ii) has at least 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 
25 and older than 49 years, respectively, the share of women and the share of blue-collar 
workers, zjt includes firm characteristics, i.e. sectoral affiliation (8 dummies), the size of the 
firm (number of workers)
5 and the level of wage bargaining (1 dummy), γt is a set of year 
dummies (7 dummies) and νjt is the error term.
6 
                                                 
4 It could have been useful to control for additional variables such as job tasks. However, our data provide little 
information on the type of jobs performed by workers (apart from the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations). Moreover, the number of variables for which we can control is restricted due to the fact that we 
have only 10 observations for certain firms in a given year. This being said, descriptive statistics (reported in 
Table 2) show that considerable heterogeneity is already encompassed by our conditional indicator. 
5 We have information on whether a firm employs between 10 and 19 workers, between 20 and 49 workers, 
between 50 and 99 workers, between 100 and 199 workers, between 200 and 499 workers or more than 500 
workers. 
6 Unfortunately, our data provide no direct information on firms’ capital stock. However, van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer (2010, p10) conclude from previous studies that ‘including or not including capital stock 
information doesn’t seem to affect the parameter estimates of production functions based on firm-level micro 
survey data’. This conclusion is in line with results from the meta-analysis performed by Doucouliagos and 
Laroche (2003). It is also worth to mention that we have no variable on the kind of pay system used by firms. 
Yet, they are likely to influence the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity. For instance, McNabb and 
Whitfield (2003) suggest that productivity is more enhanced when performance-related pay schemes are based 
on group rather than on individual measures of output. This would imply that our estimates of the relationship 
between wage dispersion and productivity under (over) estimate the true relation for firms using essentially 






From an econometric point of view, we initially estimate equation (2) by standard OLS. 
Yet, a first problem to address is the potential simultaneity between firm productivity and 
wage dispersion. Indeed, it may be argued that highly productive firms pay larger wages to 
their most productive workers, which in turn leads to more wage dispersion. We address this 
issue by regressing the log of the value added per hour worked on the wage dispersion 
indicator with one year lag, σjt-1.
7 This boils down to the estimation of the following equation: 
 
ln va_hourjt = β0 + β1 σjt-1 + xjt β2 + zjt β3 + γt + τjt                                                         (3) 
 
Next, in order to control for firm fixed-effects, we reformulate equation (3) as follows: 
 
ln va_hourjt = β0 + β1 σjt-1 + xjt β2 + zjt β3 + δj + γt + µjt                                                 (4) 
 
where  δj is a dummy variable for each firm which captures time-invariant workplace 
characteristics.  
Finally, in order to control for the potential state dependence of firm productivity, we 
estimate equation (5) using the dynamic system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). One year lagged productivity is thus used as an 
additional explanatory variable. Moreover, variables in the differenced equation are 
instrumented by their lagged levels and variables in the level equation are instrumented by 
their lagged differences. Time dummies are considered as exogeneous and we use second and 
third lags of other explanatory variables as instruments. 
 
ln va_hourjt = θ ln va_hourjt-1+ β1 σjt-1 + xjt β2 + zjt β3 + δj + γt + ωjt                             (5) 
 
3.2. Hump-shaped  relationship 
 
In all equations described so far, we also test for a hump-shaped relationship between wage 
dispersion and firm productivity. The point is that up to (beyond) a certain level of wage 
dispersion, the incentive effect predicted for instance by the ‘tournament’ model may 
dominate (may be dominated by) ‘fairness’ and/or ‘sabotage’ considerations. Therefore, we 
                                                 
7 However, this procedure should still be considered with care given that intra-firm wage inequality may be 






simply add the wage dispersion indicator in quadratic form to previous equations. Equation 
(5), for instance, then becomes: 
 
ln va_hourjt = θ ln va_hourjt-1+ β1 σjt-1 + β2 σjt-1² +  xjt β3 + zjt β4 + δj + γt + ωjt           (6) 
 
Furthermore, as there might exist a multicolinearity problem because of the correlation 
between the wage dispersion variables in level and squared, we also test for a concave 
relationship by interacting the wage dispersion indicator with two dummy variables capturing 
the size of intra-firm wage inequality:  
 
ln va_hourjt = θ ln va_hourjt-1+ β1 σjt-1 + β2 [σ*D1]jt-1 + β3 [σ*D2]jt-1 + xjt β4 + zjt β5  
     + δj + γt + ωjt                                                                                         (6’) 
 
where D1 (D2) is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion ranges 
between the 33
rd and the 66
th percentiles (is greater than or equal to the 66
th percentile) of the 
distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
 
3.3.  Interaction with working environments 
 
We then investigate whether the relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity 
depends on working environments. We first address the skill level of the workforce. To 
measure it, we follow the methodology proposed by Mahy et al. (2010). This boils down to 
combine firm-level information on the workers’ level of education and occupation and to 
estimate the following variant of equation (6’): 
 
ln va_hourjt = θ ln va_hourjt-1+ β1 σjt-1 + β2 [σ * Low_Skilled]jt-1 
  + β3 [σ * D1]jt-1 + β4 [σ *D1* Low_Skilled]jt-1 
  + β5 [σ * D2]jt-1 + β6 [σ * D2 * Low_Skilled]jt-1 
   + β7 Low_Skilledjt-1 + xjt β8 + zjt β9 + δj + γt + ωjt       (7) 
 
where ‘Low_Skilled’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the workforce of the firm is 






proportion of low-ability occupations larger than their respective medians on the whole 
sample.
8 
Finally, in order to analyse the role played by the industrial relations regime, we 
estimate equation (7’): 
 
ln va_hourjt = θ ln va_hourjt-1+ β1 σjt-1 + β2 [σ * Firm_Agreement]jt-1 
  + β3 [σ * D1]jt-1 + β4 [σ * D1 * Firm_Agreement]jt-1 
  + β5 [σ * D2]jt-1 + β6 [σ * D2 * Firm_Agreement]jt-1 
   + β7 Firm_Agreementjt-1 + xjt β8 + zjt β9 + δj + γt + ωjt                   (7’) 
 
where ‘Firm_Agreement’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is covered by a 




4. Data  set 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a combination of two large data sets covering the years 
1999-2006. The first, carried out by Statistics Belgium, is the ‘Structure of Earnings Survey’ 
(SES). It is representative of all firms operating in Belgium that employ at least 10 workers 
and with economic activities within sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature
10. The 
survey contains a wealth of information, provided by the management of firms, both on the 
characteristics of the latter (e.g. sector of activity, number of workers, level of collective wage 
bargaining) and on the individuals working there (e.g. age, education, tenure, gross earnings, 
                                                 
8 The ‘low educational level’ includes workers who have attained lower secondary qualifications at most and 
the ‘low ability occupation’ includes workers whose occupations fall into groups 7 to 9 from the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (craft and related trades workers; plant and machine operators and 
assemblers; and elementary occupations). 
9 We also did the same exercise but starting from equation (6), i.e. by interacting respectively ‘Low-Skilled’ 
and ‘Firm-Agreement’ dummy variables with the wage dispersion indicators in level and squared. However, due 
to strong multicolinearity problems, this quadratic specification had to be abandoned. 
10 It thus covers the following sectors: i) mining and quarrying (C), ii) manufacturing (D), iii) electricity, gas 
and water supply (E), iv) construction (F), v) wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods (G), vi) hotels and restaurants (H), vii) transport, storage and communication 






paid hours, sex, occupation).
11 Gross hourly wages are calculated by dividing gross earnings 
(including overtime payments, premiums for shift, night and/or weekend work and other 
bonuses) in the reference period by the corresponding number of total paid hours (including 
overtime). The SES provides no financial information. Therefore, it has been merged with a 
firm-level survey, the ‘Structure of Business Survey’ (SBS). The SBS, also conducted by 
Statistics Belgium, provides information on financial variables such as firm-level value added 
and gross operating surplus per hour worked. The coverage of the SBS differs from that of the 
SES in that it does not cover the whole financial sector (NACE J) but only Other Financial 
Intermediation (NACE 652) and Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation (NACE 67). 
The merger of the SES and SBS datasets is very precise as it has been carried out by Statistics 
Belgium on the basis of firms’ social security number. 
The computation of our conditional wage dispersion indicator requires a sufficient 
number of individual observations per firm. We therefore eliminate firms with less than 10 
observations in a given year.
12 Moreover, we exclude workers and/or firms for which data are 
                                                 
11 The SES is a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer respectively to the region (NUTS-groups), the 
principal economic activity (NACE-groups) and the size of the firm. The sample size in each stratum depends on 
the size of the firm. Sampling percentages of firms are respectively equal to 10, 50 and 100% when the number 
of workers is between 10 and 50, between 50 and 99, and above 100. Within a firm, sampling percentages of 
employees also depend on size. Sampling percentages of employees reach respectively 100, 50, 25, 14.3 and 
10% when the number of workers is between 10 and 20, between 20 and 50, between 50 and 99, between 100 
and 199, and between 200 and 299. Firms employing 300 workers or more have to report information for an 
absolute number of employees. This number ranges between 30 (for firms with between 300 and 349 workers) 
and 200 (for firms with 12,000 workers or more). To guarantee that firms report information on a representative 
sample of their workers, they are asked to follow a specific procedure. First, they have to rank their employees in 
alphabetical order. Next, Statistics Belgium give them a random letter (e.g. the letter O) from which they have to 
start when reporting information on their employees (following the alphabetical order of workers’ names in their 
list). If they reach the letter Z and still have to provide information on some of their employees, they have to 
continue from the letter A in their list. Moreover, firms that employ different categories of workers, namely 
managers, blue- and/or white-collar workers, have to set up a separate alphabetical list for each of these 
categories and to report information on a number of workers in these different groups that is proportional to their 
share in total firm employment. For example, a firm with 300 employees (namely, 60 managers, 180 white-collar 
workers and 60 blue-collar workers) will have to report information on 30 workers (namely, 6 managers, 18 
white-collar workers and 6 blue-collar workers). Finally, let us notice that no threshold at the upper limit of 
wages is found in the SES. To put it differently, wages are not censored. For an extended discussion see 
Demunter (2000). 
12 Theoretically, the characteristics of the SES data set should guarantee that the minimum number of 






missing or inaccurate. We do therefore also not consider workers earning less than the 
minimum hourly wage and firms that present negative value added.
13 Our final sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 20,613 firm-year-observations from 9,254 firms. It is 
representative of all firms employing at least 10 workers within sections C to K of the NACE 
Rev. 1 nomenclature, with the exception of large parts of the financial sector (NACE J) and 
the electricity, gas and water supply industry (NACE E). However, given that sampling 
percentages of firms in our data set increase with the size of the latter (see footnote 11), 
medium-sized and large firms are over-represented in econometric specifications requiring 
firm information on (at least) two consecutive years.
14 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 2 depicts the means and standard deviations of the main variables. It indicates that we 
are looking at firms employing 126 workers on average with a mean gross hourly wage 
(including bonuses) of 15.98 euros and a conditional hourly wage dispersion of 0.15 euro.
15 
We also observe that the average value added per hour worked amounts to 55.17 euros, and 
that around 26% of the workers are women, 57% are blue collars and 38% have a low level of 
education (i.e. lower secondary school at most). Firms are essentially concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector (46%), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods (17%), construction (13%) and in real estate, renting and 




                                                                                                                                                          
small number of cases this minimum number of data points is not reached. This could be explained for instance 
by the fact that some firms did not fill in the questionnaire for a sufficient number of their employees or because 
some questionnaires have been lost or not encoded by the administration. 
13 These selection criteria are not likely to affect our results as they lead to a small drop in sample size. 
14 Appendix 2 shows how descriptive statistics evolve when only selecting firms observed during at least two 
consecutive years. As expected, selected firms employ a larger number of workers and present the usual features 
associated to their bigger size such as higher wages and productivity, a stronger concentration in the 
manufacturing sector and a higher incidence of collective agreements at the firm level. 
15 In contrast, the average unconditional hourly wage dispersion (i.e. the standard deviation of gross hourly 
wages within each firm) amounts to 5.03 euros, which thus emphasizes that considerable heterogeneity is 








5.1. Overall  relation 
 
We first estimate equation (2) by OLS. Results presented in column 2 of Table 3 point 
towards the existence of a positive and significant relationship between wage dispersion and 
firm productivity. Indeed, the point estimate amounts to 1.45 and yields an elasticity of 0.22 
at the sample mean. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
This positive impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity tends to support the incentive 
effect predicted for instance by the ‘tournament’ model. We can, however, assume that the 
relationship could in fact be hump-shaped. Indeed, an overly small wage dispersion level 
might be harmful for firm productivity due to a lack of appropriate incentives. But excessive 
wage dispersion might also negatively affect productivity because of ‘fairness’ and/or 
‘sabotage’ issues. 
To test for a hump-shaped relationship, we first add the wage dispersion indicator in 
quadratic form to equation (2). Findings reported in column 3 of Table 3 show that the 
coefficient of wage dispersion in level is again positive and significant and that the wage 
dispersion indicator in quadratic form presents a significant negative coefficient. So evidence 
appears in favour of a hump-shaped relationship between wage dispersion and productivity. 
The results in Table 3 also allow to estimate that productivity is the greatest when the 
conditional wage dispersion indicator amounts to 1.29 euros. However, the value of this 
turning point should be interpreted with care given i) that it is lying outside of the range of the 
explanatory variable and ii) a multicolinearity problem, i.e. a strong correlation between the 
wage dispersion variables in level and squared. We also examine the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity by interacting the wage 
dispersion indicator with two dummy variables capturing the size of intra-firm wage 
inequality. Results based on this specification do not support the hump-shaped hypothesis 
(see column 4 of Table 3).  
Be that as it may, findings reported so far should be assessed with caution given that 






simultaneity between wage dispersion and firm productivity. To examine the presence of such 
a problem, we apply Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1989, 1993) version of the Hausman 
(1978) test. The result of this test, shown in column 2 of Table 3, indicates that wage 
dispersion is endogenously determined. Above-mentioned OLS results are thus inconsistent. 
To account for this issue, we estimate equation (3) using the first lag of the wage dispersion 
indicator rather than its current value as our main explanatory variable. Findings based on this 
specification are reported in columns 5 to 7 of Table 3. They support the existence of a hump-
shaped relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity. However, the Hausman 
(1978) test still rejects the null hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates (see column 5 of Table 
3). 
Our results still suffer from the fact that time-invariant workplace characteristics are not 
controlled for. Therefore, we estimate a firm fixed-effects model using one year lagged wage 
dispersion as our main explanatory variable (equation (4)). We thus examine how changes in 
lagged wage dispersion affect changes in current productivity within firms. Results, presented 
in columns 2 to 4 of Table 4, show that the regression coefficient for the wage dispersion 
indicator (in level) decreases sharply after controlling for firm fixed-effects. However, it 
remains positive and significant (see column 2). In addition, the Hausman (1978) test now 
indicates that the hypothesis of exogeneity of wage dispersion cannot be rejected. Turning to 
the specification including the wage dispersion indicator in level and squared (see column 3), 
we find that both regression coefficients are positive and not significant. Yet, these results 
should be interpreted with care given the aforementioned multicolinearity problem. 
Furthermore, findings based on our alternative specification (i.e. including wage inequality in 
interaction with dummy variables) support the hump-shaped hypothesis. Indeed, they show 
that the elasticity is significantly positive, but that its magnitude decreases sharply when a 
relatively high level of wage inequality is attained (i.e. above the 66
th percentile of intra-firm 
wage inequality). 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Another improvement in the analysis of the relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
productivity can be achieved by considering the potential state dependence of the productivity 
variable. To do so, we estimate equation (5) using the dynamic system GMM estimator 
which: i) controls for time-invariant heterogeneity of firms, ii) addresses the simultaneity 






dependence of firm productivity into account. Results are presented in columns 5 to 7 of 
Table 4. To examine their reliability, we first apply the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying 
restrictions and Arellano-Bond’s test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
errors. As shown in Table 4, they respectively do not reject the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments and of no autocorrelation. As expected, we also find that current productivity is to 
a significant and important extent related to its past value. However, results still support the 
existence of a hump-shaped relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity (see 
column 7 of Table 4). Results reported in the last column of Table 4 further allow to estimate 
that the elasticity between (one year lagged) wage dispersion and productivity is equal to 0.21 
at sample mean.
16 This value, in the range of the OLS and fixed effects estimates, suggests 
that, on average, a rise of 10% in (one year lagged) wage dispersion increases firm 
productivity by 2.1%. 
 
5.2.  Workforce skill level and industrial relations regime 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
productivity depends on: i) the skill level of the workforce, and ii) the industrial relations 
regime. To do so, we estimate respectively equations (7) and (7’) using the dynamic system 
GMM estimator. Results are reported in Table 5. For all working environments, the Hansen 
(1982) test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond’s test for second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors again respectively do not reject the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments and of no autocorrelation. In addition, findings show the 
existence of a significant hump-shaped relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
productivity, whatever the skill level of the workforce and the level of wage bargaining. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Results, reported in the second column of Table 5, further indicate that the effect of 
wage dispersion on firm productivity is significantly larger for firms with a highly skilled 
                                                 
16 The sample mean value of intra-firm wage dispersion is equal to 0.16. This value lies between the 33
rd and 
the 66
th percentiles of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. As a result the elasticity at 
sample mean is obtained by multiplying 0.16 by the sum of the regression coefficients associated respectively to 
the wage dispersion variable in level (3.08) and to the wage dispersion indicator interacted with the appropriate 






workforce, i.e. for firms with a small proportion of low-skilled workers. These results tend to 
support Barth et al. (2008), Foss and Laursen (2005) and Prendergast’s (2002) arguments. 
Indeed, they might be explained by the fact that highly skilled workers are more costly to 
monitor and can increase their productivity more easily than their low-skilled counterparts. 
Moreover, they are in line with earlier results obtained by Mahy et al. (2010) on the basis of 
cross-sectional data for the Belgian economy. 
As regards the industrial relations regime, no significant difference is found in the 
elasticity between productivity and wage dispersion between firms that are solely covered by 
an industry collective agreement and firms in which wages are collectively renegotiated (see 
results in the third column of Table 5). This finding suggests that the efficiency of 
performance pay schemes (measured through their impact on productivity) does not depend 
on whether wages are collectively renegotiated at the firm level. Put differently, it does not 
seem to support the hypothesis that firms solely covered by centralised bargaining (i.e. 
industry collective agreements) face additional difficulties to implement a coherent internal 
wage policy, with effective differential rewards. This could be explained by the fact that these 
firms still have the possibility to change their pay structure at the company level through 
individual bargaining or unilateral employers’ decisions. It should also be recalled that firm-
level collective agreements in Belgium always complement industry agreements. Moreover, 
the wage bargained at the firm level can only be greater than or equal to the wage set at the 
industry level. Therefore, industry agreements are likely to constrain similarly the wage 
policy of all firms, whether or not covered by a company collective agreement. Findings also 
tend to suggest that factors such as information, commitment, consensus and certainty in the 
evaluation process, which are expected to enhance productivity effects of wage inequality 
(Pfeffer and Langton, 1993), are not more present in firms where performance pay systems 
are negotiated with trade unions at the company level. Moreover, the ability to renegotiate 
wages at this level does not seem to improve the degree of trust in the relations between 
management and employees. Indeed, results suggest that pay-for-performance systems have 
the same efficiency in firms solely covered by an industry agreement, i.e. in firms where such 














Firms try to design appropriate incentive mechanisms to optimize workers’ productivity. In 
this context, relative wages are often considered to play a determinant role. If workers 
compare their wages with those of their co-workers when choosing their level of effort, wage 
dispersion at the firm level becomes a crucial variable for explaining workers’ productivity 
and firm performance. 
Theoretical predictions regarding the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity are 
quite controversial. In the context of performance-related pay systems based on relative 
criteria, the ‘tournament’ model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) stresses that a more differentiated 
wage structure stimulates workers’ effort through the incentive resulting from awarding the 
largest prize to the most productive worker. However, Lazear (1989, 1995) later showed in 
his ‘industrial politics and sabotage’ model that the tournament theory might also sometimes 
require wage compression. Moreover, other theories argue that wage compression reinforces 
workers’ productivity by either improving labour relations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988), 
sustaining and stimulating cohesiveness among the workforce (Levine, 1991) or preventing 
workers from engaging in costly rent-seeking activities instead of productive work (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1990).  
Given the importance of this issue and the ambiguity of theoretical predictions, 
empirical tests are needed to discriminate among opposing hypotheses. Yet, the empirical 
literature on intra-firm wage dispersion and firm productivity is very inconclusive. Moreover, 
the validity of most results is difficult to assess due to various methodological and/or data 
limitations (i.e. in terms of indicators used, data coverage or estimation strategy). In addition, 
studies considering that this relationship might be influenced by specific working 
environments are not numerous. 
Therefore, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, it puts the relationship between wage 
dispersion and firm productivity to an updated test, taking advantage of access to detailed 
Belgian LEE panel data for the years 1999-2006. Our paper contributes significantly to the 
existing literature as it is the first, as far as we know, to simultaneously: i) focus on a large 
part of the private sector, ii) use both a conditional wage dispersion indicator and accurate 
information on firm productivity, namely the average value added per hour worked, iii) 






simultaneity between the latter and productivity) and for time-invariant workplace 
characteristics, and iv) adopt a dynamic specification to control for the potential state 
dependence of the productivity measure. Next, this paper examines whether the relationship 
between wage dispersion and firm productivity varies across different working environments. 
More precisely, it investigates the interaction with the skills of the workforce and the 
industrial relations regime. To our knowledge, the second issue has so far only been 
empirically explored by Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) with German data. 
Results based on our preferred specification show the existence of a significant hump-
shaped relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity for all working 
environments under investigation. They thus suggest that the incentive effect of wage 
dispersion, predicted for instance by the ‘tournament’ model, dominates ‘fairness’ and/or 
‘sabotage’ considerations, though the latter become increasingly important as wage dispersion 
rises. 
Moreover, we find that the intensity of the relationship between wage dispersion and 
firm productivity is stronger among firms with a larger proportion of highly skilled workers. 
This might be explained by the fact that monitoring costs and production-effort elasticity are 
greater for those workers. In contrast, the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity is 
not found to depend on whether wages are collectively renegotiated at the firm level. This 
finding may suggest that factors such information, commitment, consensus and certainty in 
the evaluation process, which are expected to enhance productivity effects of wage inequality 
(Pfeffer and Langton, 1993), are not more present in firms where performance pay systems 
are negotiated with trade unions at the company level. Moreover, it does not seem to support 
the hypothesis that firms solely covered by centralised bargaining (i.e. industry collective 
agreements) face additional difficulties to implement a coherent internal wage policy, with 
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Table 1. Studies on broad occupational groups and industries that do control for firm fixed effects 













Austria  Panel data on 130 
firms, 1975-91 
 
Yes Standardized  wages 
for white- and blue-
collar workers 
No  No  OLS: hump-shaped relationship for both 
white- and blue-collar workers 
Fixed-effects: no significant impact for 
blue-collar workers and flatter hump-
shaped relationship for white-collar 
workers 
Beaumont and Harris 
(2003) 
UK  Panel data on firms 




Value added per 
worker  
Yes Yes GMM: negative (positive) impact of 
wage dispersion on firm performance in 
1 (4) sector(s). 
Heyman (2005)  Sweden  Panel data for white-
collar workers and 
managers in private 





Profits per employee  Yes  No  OLS, 2SLS and first-differences: 
positive impact for white-collar workers 
and managers 
Koubi and Roux 
(2006) 
France  Panel data on 60551 
firms, 1994-2002 
Yes  Value added per 
worker and gross 
operation surplus 
divided by capital 
Yes No  OLS, long differences, GMM : positive 
impact of wage dispersion on 
productivity in most sectors 
investigated 
Braakmann (2008)  (West) 
Germany 
Panel data on 11,000 
firms, 1995-2005 
Yes  Sales per worker  Yes  Yes  Fixed-effects / GMM: negative or U-








Value added per 
employee 
No Yes  OLS / Fixed effects: hump-shaped / no 
significant relationship between 
dispersion in wage levels and firm 
productivity 
Martins (2008)  Portugal  Panel data on 4,735 
firms, 1991-2000 
Yes  Sales per worker  No  No  OLS / Fixed effects: positive / negative 
relationship  
Hunnes (2009)  Norway  Panel data covering 
white-collar workers 
(only full-time) in 
1,723 firms, 1986-97 
Yes Gross  production 
value and profits per 
employee 
 
Yes No  OLS / Fixed effects: positive / no 
significant relationship between the 
dispersion in the fixed component of 
wages and firm performance 
No robust relationship between bonus 
payments and firm performance 
Note: For more detailed results see Appendix 1. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of selected variables  
Variables: Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Hourly value added (€
1) 55.17  500.8 
Gross hourly wage (€
1) 15.98  5.76 
Gross monthly wage (€
1) 2476.93  929.27 
Intra-firm wage dispersion (€
1): 
     Conditional wage dispersion
2  0.15 0.09 
     Unconditional standard deviation of wages
3  5.03 7.49 
Size of the firm (number of workers)  125.58  355.17 
Age (%)    
     Less than 25 years  9.12  10.31 
     Between 25 and 49 years  75.22  13.71 
     50 years and more  15.66  12.89 
Women (%)  26.15  24.29 
Education (%): 
     No degree, primary/lower secondary
  37.96 34.66 
     General upper secondary, technical/artistic/prof. upper secondary   39.68  30.52 
     Higher non university, university and post graduate  22.36  26.55 
Blue-collar workers
4 (%)   57.14  35.13 
Firm-level collective agreement (%)  16.92  37.49 
Sector (%): 
     Mining and quarrying (C)   0.37   
     Manufacturing (D)   45.57   
     Electricity, gas and water supply (E)  0.07   
     Construction (F)   13.19   
     Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
     and personal and household goods (G)   17.01   
     Hotels and restaurants (H)   2.77   
     Transport, storage and communication (I)   7.9   
     Financial intermediation (J)   1.04   
     Real estate, renting and business activities (K)   12.1   
Number of observations  20,613 
Number of firms  9,254 
1 At 2006 constant prices. 
2 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and 
workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology 
(i.e. standard deviations of residuals of wage regressions run for each firm and each year separately). 
3 Standard 
deviation of gross hourly wages within each firm.
 4 The distinction between blue- and white-collar workers is 
based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). Workers belonging to groups 1 to 
5 are considered to be white-collar workers (1: Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2: Professionals; 3: 
Technicians and associate professionals; 4: Clerks; 5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers) and 
those from groups 7 to 9 are considered to be blue-collar workers (7: Craft and related trades workers; 8: Plant 







Table 3. Wage dispersion and firm productivity: OLS results 
Dependent variable:  Value added per hour worked (ln) 
















Conditional wage dispersion 




















Conditional wage dispersion * D1 
2     -0.05 
(0.12) 
   
Conditional wage dispersion * D2 
3     0.21 
(0.16) 
   
























One year lagged (conditional wage 
dispersion * D1) 
 2 
         -0.56** 
(0.23) 
One year lagged (conditional wage 
dispersion * D2) 
 3 
         -0.5* 
(0.3) 
Worker characteristics 
4 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
5 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies (7)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R² 
  0.19 0.19  0.19  0.21  0.21  0.21 
Sig. Model (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hausman statistic 
     p-value 
-9.08 
0.00 





Number of observations  20,613  20,613  20,613  6,789  6,789  6,789 
Number of firms  9,254  9,254 9,254  2,494  2,494  2,494 
Notes: ***/**/* significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the 
wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard deviations of 
residuals of wage regressions run for each firm and each year separately). 
2 D1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion ranges between the 33
rd and the 66
th 
percentiles of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
3 D2 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion is greater than or equal to the 66
th 
percentile of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
4 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most a degree of lower secondary education, ii) has at least 10 years of 
tenure, and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 49 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of 
blue-collar workers are also included. 



















Table 4. Wage dispersion and firm productivity: Fixed-effects and GMM results 
Dependent variable:  Value added per hour worked (ln) 










































One year lagged (conditional wage 
dispersion * D1) 
2 
   -0.24 
(0.16) 
   -1.74* 
(1.02) 
One year lagged (conditional wage 
dispersion * D2) 
3 
   -0.32* 
(0.19) 
   -2.21* 
(1.27) 
One year lagged value added per hour 
worked (ln) 







4 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
5 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies (7)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Within R²
  0.03 0.03  0.03      
Sig. Model (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hausman statistic 
     p-value 
-0.11 
0.92 
        
Hansen statistic 
     p-value 






Arellano-Bond statistic (AR2) 
6 
     p-value 






Number of instruments 
7       256  270  284 
Number of observations  6,789  6,789 6,789  6,789  6,789  6,789 
Number of firms  2,494  2,494 2,494  2,494  2,494  2,494 
Notes: ***/**/* significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets.  
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the 
wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard deviations of 
residuals of wage regressions run for each firm and each year separately). 
2 D1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion ranges between the 33
rd and the 66
th 
percentiles of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
3 D2 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion is greater than or equal to the 66
th 
percentile of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
4 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most a degree of lower secondary education, ii) has at least 10 years of 
tenure, and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 49 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of 
blue-collar workers are also included.  
5 Sectoral affiliation (8 dummies), number of workers and level of wage bargaining (1 dummy). 
6 AR2 displays the test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. 







Table 5. Wage dispersion and firm productivity by workforce skill level and industrial 
relations regime 
Dependent variable:  Value added per hour worked (ln) 
  Equation (7)  Equation (7’) 
  System GMM 



















One year lagged (conditional wage dispersion * D1 * Low_Skilled)  0.90** 
(0.43) 
 
One year lagged (conditional wage dispersion * D2 * Low_Skilled)  0.86 
(0.57) 
 


















6 Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
7 Yes  Yes 
Year dummies (7)  Yes  Yes 
Sig. Model (p-value)  0.000  0.000 
Hansen statistic 





Arellano-Bond statistic (AR2) 
8 





Number of instruments 
9 373  354 
Number of observations  6,789  6,789 
Number of firms  2,494  2,494 
Notes: ***/**/* significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors between brackets.  
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in 
the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard deviations 
of residuals of wage regressions run for each firm and each year separately). 
2 D1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion ranges between the 33
rd and the 66
th 
percentiles of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
3 D2 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if intra-firm wage dispersion is greater than or equal to the 66
th 
percentile of the distribution of intra-firm wage inequality across firms. 
4 “Low_Skilled” is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the workforce of the firm is low-skilled (i.e. if the 
firm presents both a proportion of low-educated workers and a proportion of low-ability occupations larger 
than their respective medians on the whole sample, respectively 0.30 and 0.69). 
5 “Firm_Agreement” is a dummy variable that is equal to one in the presence of a firm-level collective 
agreement (and zero if the firm is solely covered by an industry collective agreement). 
6 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most a degree of lower secondary education, ii) has at least 10 years of 
tenure, and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 49 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of 
blue-collar workers are also included.  
7  Sectoral affiliation (8 dummies), number of workers, dummy “Low_Skilled” (only in model testing 
interaction with workforce skill level), and dummy “Firm_Agreement”. Note that regression coefficients 
associated to the dummies “Low_Skilled” and “Firm_Agreement” are not significant at the 10 percent level.  
8 AR2 displays the test for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. 
9 First and second lags of explanatory variables, excluding time dummies, are used as instruments. 31 
 
Appendix 1. Wage dispersion and firm performance: selected empirical studies 












US  Panel data on executives 
in 439 large corporations, 
1981-85 
Unconditional: 
standard deviation of 
pay 
Return on equity  OLS and 
fixed-effects 






and Europe  
Cross-sectional data on 
102 business units in 41 
corporations 
Semi-conditional:  
pay of hourly 
employees relative to 
the top three levels of 
management, 
controlling for the 








US  Cross-sectional data on 
around 350 professional 
baseball teams, 4 seasons 
(1976, 1977, 1987, 1988) 
and on 301 professional 
basketball teams, 1 season 
(1987) 
Conditional:  
two separate measures 




for baseball (e.g. 
runs created, total 
average) and for 
basketball (e.g. 
points scored, 









No / Yes  Different responses to inequity measures:  
Basketball: underreward leads to selfish 
behaviour, overreward to cooperative 
behaviour. 
Baseball: results are less clear. 
 
Main et al. 
(1993) 
US  Panel data on executives 
in 210 firms, 1980-84 
Unconditional: 
coefficient of variation 
of wages 
 
Return on assets 
(ROA) and stock 
market return 
OLS  No / No  Positive impact of wage dispersion on 





US  Cross-sectional data on 
more than 17,000 college 
and university professors 















OLS  No / No  Negative impact of wage dispersion on 
performance but magnitude depends on a 
person’s position in the salary structure, 
information, commitment, consensus and 




US  Cross-sectional data on 
professional baseball 
teams, 3 seasons (1992, 
Unconditional: 
variance of team 
salaries 
Winning percentage 
and probability to 
win a title 
OLS and 
probit  
No / No  Negative effect of wage dispersion on the 
winning percentage but no significant 











Panel data on 29 
professional baseball 




coefficient of variation 
of pay, difference 
between the greatest 
pay in a team and a 
player’s pay, ratio of a 
player’s pay to the 


















No / No  Negative impact of pay dispersion on 
players’ and teams’ performances 
Eriksson 
(1999) 
Denmark  Panel data on executives 
in 210 firms, 1992-95 
Unconditional: 
coefficient of variation 
of wages 
Profits/sales ratio  OLS and 
fixed-effects 
No / No  Weak positive impact of wage dispersion 









standard errors of wage 
regressions 
Standardized wages 





No / No OLS: hump-shaped relationship for both 
white- and blue-collar workers (but 
turning point at a higher level of wage 
dispersion for blue-collar workers) 
Fixed-effects: no significant impact for 
blue-collar workers and flatter hump-
shaped relationship for white-collar 
workers 






Sweden Aggregated  individual 
wage data, at plant (1972-
93) and industry level 
(1963-93) 
Unconditional:  
squared coefficient of 
variation of wages 
among workers arrayed 
by industries or plants, 




Real value added 
and real value 
added divided by 
blue-collar hours 
OLS   No / Yes  Dispersion of wages within (between) 
firms has a positive (negative) impact on  
productivity 








1992-95  standard deviation and 
skewness of the 
residuals of wage 
regressions   
productivity (Solow 




(inverse of sickness 
absence) 
2SLS information  from 
the income tax 
system) / No 
for white-collar workers; very weak, if 
any, positive impact for blue-collar 
workers  
Effort: positive relationship for white-





US  Panel data on 26 
professional hockey teams 
(773 players), 1993-98 
Unconditional:  
Gini coefficient  
Winning percentage 







No / No  OLS: positive impact of wage dispersion 
on team performance 
Fixed-effects: no significant relationship 
First differences: negative relationship, 




UK  Panel data on firms in 5 
industrial sectors, 1978-95 
Unconditional:  
ratio of non-manual to 
manual labour costs per 
employee 
 
Gross value added 
divided by the 





Yes (IV: lagged 
values of 
repressors) / Yes 
Negative (positive) impact of wage 
dispersion on firm performance in 1 (4) 
sector(s). 
Frick et al. 
(2003) 
US  Panel data on professional 
baseball (1985-2001), 
basketball (1990-2000), 
football (1988, 1991, 
1995-2005) and hockey 
(1988, 1993, 1995-2000) 
teams 
Unconditional: 
Gini coefficient  
Win percentage in 





No / No  Positive (negative) impact of wage 
dispersion on the performance of 
basketball (baseball) teams 
 




US  Panel data on professional 
baseball teams, 1985-98 
Conditional:  
dispersion of the 
residuals of wage 
regressions and 
dispersion of expected 





(without controlling for 
workers’ differences)  
Won-lost 
percentage and 








Sweden  Panel data for white-collar 
workers and managers in 
private sector firms, 1991 
Conditional (only for 
white-collar workers):  
variance of the 
Profits divided by 





Yes (IV: lagged 
values of wage 
dispersion) / No 
Positive impact for white-collar workers 











workers: coefficient of 




coefficient of variation 
of wages, wage 
difference and ratio 










France  Panel data on 60551 firms, 
1994-2002 
Conditional:  
coefficient of variation 
of (the exponential of) 
the residuals of wage 
regressions 
Value added and 
gross operating 









evolution of wage 
dispersion 
indicator) / No 
 
OLS: positive impact of wage dispersion 
on value added and gross operating 
surplus divided by capital 
Long differences : positive (negative) 
impact on value added (gross operating 
surplus divided by capital) (in most 
sectors investigated) 
GMM: positive impact of wage 




Germany  Cross-sectional data on 
372 manufacturing firms 
(blue-collar workers only), 
1997 
Unconditional: 
difference between the 
highest hourly wage of 
a skilled blue-collar 
worker and the lowest 





divided by the 
number of 
employees 
OLS  No / No  No uniform (no significant) relationship 
when interactions with the industrial 
relations regime and the incentive scheme 
are (not) taken into account  
Lallemand et 
al. (2007) 
Belgium  Cross-sectional data on 
397 firms, 1995 
Conditional:  





divided by the 
number of workers 
OLS and 
2SLS 
Yes (IV: intra-firm 
standard deviation 
of income taxes on 
gross earnings 
excluding 
Positive relationship, stronger for blue-
collar workers and within firms with a 







coefficient of variation 
and max-min ratio of 
wages 





Panel data on 11,000 
firms, 1995-2005 
Conditional:  
standard deviation of 




coefficient of variation 
of wages (in the firm as 
a whole and within 
subgroups) 
Sales divided by the 






Yes / Yes  Fixed-effects: negative or U-shaped 
relationship  





Denmark  Panel data on 5,736 firms, 
1992-97 
Dispersion of wage 
levels: Unconditional, 
i.e. coefficient of 
variation of wages  
 
Dispersion of wage 
increases: 
Unconditional, i.e. 
coefficient of variation 









No / Yes  Dispersion of wage levels: hump-shaped 
relationship with OLS, no significant 
relationship with fixed-effects  
Dispersion of wage increases: U-shaped 
relationship  
Results are mainly driven by white-collar 
rather than blue-collar workers 
Martins 
(2008) 
Portugal  Panel data on 4,735 firms, 
1991-2000 
Conditional:  
standard deviation and 
difference between the 
90th and 10th 
percentiles of the 
residuals of wage 
equations including 
both worker and firm 
fixed-effects 
Sales divided by the 
number of workers 
OLS and 
fixed-effects 
No / No OLS: positive relationship  
Fixed-effects: negative relationship  
Hunnes 
(2009) 
Norway  Panel data covering white-
collar workers (only full-
time) in 1,723 firms, 
1986-97 
Dispersion in the fixed 
component of wages: 
Conditional, i.e 
standard deviation of 
Gross production 
value and profits 





Yes (the bonus 
dummy is 
instrumented by 
the union density 
OLS : positive relationship between the 
dispersion in the fixed component of 
wages and firm performance 






the residuals of fixed-
effects wage equations 
where the parameters 
do not vary within or 
between firms over 
time (controlling or not 
for the hierarchical 
levels) 
Unconditional, i.e. 
coefficient of variation 
of wages and Theil 
index (decomposed in a 
within- and a between- 
hierarchical level) 
 
Dispersion in the 
variable component of 
wages: Unconditional, 
i.e.  standard deviation 
of bonuses and dummy 
variable for bonuses 
employees 
 
and its lagged 
values) / No 
between the dispersion in the fixed 
component of wages and firm 
performance 
No robust relationship between bonus 
payments and firm performance 
Mahy et al. 
(2010) 
Belgium  Cross-sectional data on 
649 firms, 2003 
Conditional: standard 
deviation of the 
residuals of wage 
regressions  
Unconditional: 
standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation 
of wages  
Value added 
divided by the 
number of workers 




dispersion) / No 
Hump-shaped relationship, stronger for 






Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics: all firms vs. firms observed for at least two 
consecutive years 
Variables: All  firms  Firms  observed 
for at least two 
consecutive years 





















Intra-firm wage dispersion (€
1): 





















    

























































     Mining and quarrying (C)   0.37  0.62 
     Manufacturing (D)   45.57  57.42 
     Electricity, gas and water supply (E)  0.07  0.06 
     Construction (F)   13.19  11.84 
     Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
     and personal and household goods (G)   17.01  10.87 
     Hotels and restaurants (H)   2.77  1.37 
     Transport, storage and communication (I)   7.9  5.61 
     Financial intermediation (J)   1.04  1.38 
     Real estate, renting and business activities (K)   12.1  10.83 
Number of observations  20,613  6,789 
Number of firms  9,254  2,494 
Notes: Standard deviations are shown in brackets. 
1 At 2006 constant prices. 
2 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and 
workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology 
(i.e. standard deviations of residuals of wage regressions run for each firm and each year separately). 
3 Standard 
deviation of gross hourly wages within each firm.
 4 The distinction between blue- and white-collar workers is 






5 are considered to be white-collar workers (1: Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2: Professionals; 3: 
Technicians and associate professionals; 4: Clerks; 5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers) and 
those from groups 7 to 9 are considered to be blue-collar workers (7: Craft and related trades workers; 8: Plant 
and machine operators and assemblers; 9: Elementary occupations).    
 